Section 21 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. This is the right against double jeopardy clause.
In this week’s column, we will discuss the history, elements and application of this constitutional right.
The right against double jeopardy was brought into the Philippine legal system by the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Kepner v. United States (Kepner). In the said case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines reversed a ruling of the court of first instance acquitting the accused therein of estafa. When the accused therein appealed to the SCOTUS, the SCOTUS reversed the ruling of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, holding that the principles of law in the United States which were deemed by then President William McKinley as necessary for the maintenance of individual freedom – which includes the right against double jeopardy – were brought to the Philippines by Congress’ act of passing the Philippine Bill of 1902. The SCOTUS explained:[1]
When Congress came to pass the act of July 1, 1902, it enacted, almost in the language of the President’s instructions, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. In view of the expressed declaration of the President, followed by the action of Congress, both adopting, with little alteration, the provisions of the Bill of Rights, there would seem to be no room for argument that, in this form, it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our Government which the President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom, at the same time expressing regret that the inhabitants of the islands had not theretofore enjoyed their benefit. Kepner was the standing doctrine when the 1935 Constitution was being drafted. In the deliberations, efforts were exerted to reject Kepner and to change the wording of the constitutional provision such that the right against double jeopardy would be applicable only once the accused has been acquitted or convicted “by final judgment.” These efforts, however, were rejected.[2]
Since then, the understanding of what the right against double jeopardy entails has remained the same even with the subsequent changes in the Constitution. Jurisprudence has provided that for the said right to attach, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid indictment, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. To give life to the right against double jeopardy, the Court has, in numerous occasions, adhered to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, which provides that “a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.”[3]
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States, “the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.”[4]
In People v. Velasco the Court explained the rationale behind the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as follows: The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into “the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State” Thus Green expressed the concern that “the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.”[5]
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to ensure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.[6] The finality-of-acquittal doctrine, of course, is not without exception. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution – the sovereign people, as represented by the State – was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine does not apply when the prosecution was denied its day in court – or simply, denied due process.
¹G.R. No. 237798 – Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs The People of the Philippines
²Idem
³Idem
⁴G.R. No. 237798
⁵Idem
⁶Idem
[1] G.R. No. 237798 – Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs The People of the Philippines
[2] Idem
[3] Idem
[4] G.R. No. 237798
[5] Idem
[6] Idem