The Supreme Court (SC) en banc has found Catanduanes Tribune publisher Fernan A. Gianan guilty of ordinary libel, affirming with modification the 2023 resolution of the Court of Appeals that found him guilty of cyberlibel.
The decision on G.R. No. 265046 signed by 14 justices and promulgated Oct. 21, 2025 sentenced the accused to pay a fine of P6,000 instead of the P7,500 fine imposed by the appeals court.
However, the High Court retained the P1 million in moral damages and P300,000 in attorney’s fees awarded by the CA to Sunwest Water & Electric Co. (SUWECO).
It may be recalled that on Dec. 21, 2020, the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 1 sentenced Tribune columnist Rosulo Manlangit and publisher Gianan to imprisonment ranging from three months to three years and to pay the island’s biggest power supplier P8 million in moral damages and P1.265 million as attorney’s fees.
The RTC decision was handed down by then Presiding Judge Ignacio Almodovar on his last day in office before he retired.
The case involves the publication of Manlangit’s opinion piece in 2016 implying that SUWECO had colluded with officials of the First Catanduanes Electric Cooperative, Inc. (FICELCO) to secure a prejudicial amendment to the Electric Supply Agreement (ESA), and that SUWECO bribed the latter via wining and dining at a casino hotel in Manila and all-expense paid trips to Asian cities.
The adverse RTC ruling was appealed by Gianan with the CA and subsequently the Supreme Court in 2023, with the petition for review assigned to the Third Division.
On Jan. 15, 2025, the justices of the Third Division decided to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc, which accepted the same on 13 days later.
It took the 15 justices, with Associate Justice Samuel Gaerlan as ponente, nine months to reach a decision but the copy of the 108-page decision itself, including three dissenting and concurring opinions, was received to the SC Clerk of Court only on Nov. 6, 2026 or more than a year after it was promulgated.
As of press time, a search of the Supreme Court website yielded no record of the Oct. 21, 2025 decision, the Third Division’s resolution of Jan. 15, 2025 referring the case to the SC proper, or the Jan. 28, 2025 en banc resolution accepting the same.
In the Petition for Review filed through his counsel Villanueva Gabionza & Dy Law Offices, Gianan argued that SUWECO counsel ACCRALAW should not have been allowed to participate in the proceedings before the CA by filing its own appellee’s brief, which is improper.
He insisted that SUWECO is a public figure for purposes of the case and that the article in question falls under the exception of privileged communications due to its nature as a fair commentary on a matter of public interest.
The petition also claimed that there was no malice in fact to be found in the article in question, and that the CA erred in finding otherwise.
In denying the petition for lack of merit, the SC en banc ruled that the CA was well within its discretion when it allowed ACCRALAW to participate in the proceedings and defend the interest of its client relative to the civil aspect of the case.
“However, SUWECO had no personality to file its own Appellee’s Brief, since properly speaking, only the OSG, on behalf of respondent, could do this before the CA,” the SC stressed.
It noted that SUWECO, through ACCRALAW, actually filed several pleadings relative to the petition, attempting to participate directly in the instant proceedings as if it were the true respondent.
In frowning upon its counsel’s “overzealous” representation that seeks to indirectly present SUWECO’s stance on the criminal aspect of the petition, the High Court issued a definitive warning to any and all private complainants and their counsel in future criminal cases to desist from filing pleadings of a similar nature.
On the issue of the petitioner’s conviction for cyberlibel, the Court noted that the Amended Information filed before the RTC did not state any circumstance indicating that the article in question was published by means of a computer system or any other similar means.
“To convict petitioner here of libel as qualified by Republic Act No. 10175 would be to unduly violate his constitutional right to be informed of the whole nature of the charge against him,” it said, adding that the petitioner can, at most, only be convicted of libel as ordinarily defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
On the question of whether SUWECO can be considered a public figure, the SC said it is evident that it does indeed qualify as a public figure and that any reportage or commentary on any anomalies relating to regulation and government contracts involving SUWECO’s services are prima facie within the ambit of protected speech, so long as there is no actual malice involved.
The Court, however, found that both the trial and appellate courts did not err in finding actual malice as evidenced by the utter lack of care for, and attention to, the simplest of journalistic principles in publishing the article in question.
“Malicious gossip formulated from thin air – which is what the article in question amounted to – cannot merit protection from the law due to the presence of actual malice in the dispersal of intentionally unverified and deliberately unfounded prevarications,” it stressed.
On the matter of the CA’s reduction of the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, the Court found that the CA was well within its discretion to reduce the award as adjudged by the trial court, “which was indeed a touch too exorbitant.”
While it saw the need to clarify the standards by which moral damages are to be adjudged and awarded to corporations in cases of libel or other forms of defamation, the Court did not apply the standards suggested by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, including requiring corporations to specifically allege the nature of reputational injury suffered and present concrete evidence to support the claim.
“In the Court’s mind, it would an injustice to even contemplate remanding the case back to the trial court (or even the appellate court) for the determination of the awardable moral damages here…,” it ruled.
