The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), particularly Article 13, paragraph 7, considers as a mitigating circumstance the scenario where the offender voluntarily surrender himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agents, or voluntarily confesses his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. Mitigating circumstances are factor that reduce the degree of moral culpability and result in a lighter penalty.
The first portion of paragraph 7, Article 13 pertains to “voluntary surrender” which shall be the core of this discussion. Every first-year law student memorizes the elements or requisites of voluntary surrender as set forth by the commentaries of Associate Justice Luis B. Reyes, namely: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary.
As pointed out by the Honorable Supreme Court in a recent case promulgated in August 2025 (G.R. No. 258592), the third requisite “voluntariness”-dominated the discussions in Philippine criminal law jurisprudence relative to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The first case to discuss “voluntariness” was People v. Sakam, where the Court explained that, in order for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be taken into consideration in favor of an accused, it is necessary that the surrender be spontaneous in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Then came People vs Yecla where it was held that “the fact that the order of arrest of the appellant had already been issued is no bar to the consideration of this circumstance, because the law does not require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest”.
However, this pronouncement was somewhat opposed by People vs Roldan where the Court declared that “it appears that appellant surrendered only after the warrant of arrest was served upon him, which cannot be considered as voluntary surrender”. Other cases that followed the teachings in Roldan ruled that the “issuance and existence of the arrest warrant was what characterized the apprehension of one of the accused as imminent”.
Other jurisprudential pronouncements made by the Supreme Court as to the matters that need to be considered in determining voluntariness or spontaneity are as follows: (1) the fact of flight into fugitive life as a critical sign of lack of spontaneity; (2) however, it is not a requirement for the accused to surrender at the first opportunity to do so, as long as the requirement of voluntary surrender have been validly met; and (3) the intention of the accused at the time he or she allegedly surrenders.
With all these “tweaks” pertaining the interpretation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstances and the discernible contradictions among various trains of jurisprudence, the Honorable Supreme Court laid down in Loza vs People (G.R. No. 258592) laid down the guidelines on voluntary surrender in criminal cases, to wit:
Firstly, voluntariness-and ultimately, spontaneity-requires two intentions which is either acknowledgment of guilt or a wish to save the authorities the trouble of searching for and arresting the accused. Secondly, the circumstances of voluntary surrender may exist in tandem with, but also independent of, the issuance of a warrant of arrest. This means that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the voluntary surrender outweighs the fact that a warrant of arrest had already been issued. However, circumstances such as the accused knowledge of the warrant of arrest and continued evasion of justice may negate the intention of voluntariness and, ultimately, of spontaneity. Thirdly, the amount of time the accused has utilized to evade the law is not the only criterion for totally negating spontaneity. It is only one among several factors to be considered in adjudging whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance. It cannot be the sole basis for denying the accused said benefit; however, depending on the other circumstances, it may weigh heavily in the ultimate consideration.
Fourthly, the notion of imminence of arrest should be considered in conjunction with any indication of flight and/or fugitive situation of the accused, and not in conjunction with the issuance of a warrant of arrest, which has been explained to be an independent circumstance separate, but still related remotely to the act of voluntary surrender. And previously mentioned, imminence runs together with the lack of spontaneity due to the realization of the impossibility of evading the authorities for longer. Fifthly, the intention of the accused at the relevant time should also be one among the other considerations when adjudging a claim of voluntary surrender. This also has to be squared with the said other considerations, since there could be contradictory outcomes, such as, for example, when the accused went to a police station a first time for one purpose, and when he or she went there a second time with a different purpose in mind. It would therefore be improper to consider the intention of the accused during his or her first visit to the police station as the sole determinative factor in his or her claim of voluntary surrender, especially if the said surrender happened during the second visit. Thus, it is totality of the accused’s intention that must ultimately be determined and weighed. And Lastly, the Court is reminded of its ruling in People v. Barzales, where it categorically ruled that where the records do not clearly show that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, doubt cannot be resolved in his or her favor.