In Southeast Asia, democracy has taken root unevenly since the mid-20th century. From the euphoric People Power Revolution in the Philippines in 1986 to Indonesia’s Reformasi movement in 1998, Southeast Asia has witnessed bursts of enthusiasm for democracy, but often with authoritarian undertows.
As of late last year, a confluence of economic grievances, geopolitical tensions, and elite entrenchment threatens these gains. In light of recent upheavals in Jakarta, Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Manila — often dubbed “the Asian Spring” — political pundits are asking whether democracy can endure in Southeast Asia, or if it risks succumbing to a hybrid form of authoritarianism.
The prognosis is guarded: Survival hinges on public mobilization, institutional reforms, and a rejection of nostalgia for authoritarian strongmen.
Indonesia, a G20 member and Southeast Asia’s largest democracy with a population of 290 million, experienced sporadic demonstrations lasting 10 months in Jakarta as well as in the hinterlands. This exemplifies both the promise and peril of post-authoritarian governance. Established after the fall of Suharto’s New Order in 1998, its system has weathered multiple elections and fostered pluralism.
However, under President Prabowo Subianto, inaugurated in October 2024, cracks have widened.
Protests erupting in August 2025 over economic inequality, food price surges, and austerity measures escalated into nationwide clashes, claiming at least 10 lives and leading to more than 4,300 arrests.
Environmental disasters like Sumatra’s floods in late November, which displaced a million people and killed more than 900, underscored government neglect, allegedly tied to corruption and deforestation for palm oil.
Prabowo’s expansion of military roles in civilian affairs evoked Suharto-era militarism, while his bloated cabinet co-opted rivals and diluted opposition.
Yet, optimism persists: Student-led activism, amplified on social media, Reformasi’s spirit, and concessions like promised probes into police violence suggest that pressure yielded results.
What’s more, Indonesia’s culturally diverse 15,000-island archipelago acts as a buffer against total centralization, hinting that democracy, though strained, could rebound if economic reforms address the 42 million facing underemployment and job scarcity.
Cambodia is a sharp contrast with this. In Cambodia democracy wears a thin veneer. Under the Cambodian People’s Party, led by the Hun family dynasty, the nation has devolved into a one-party state since the 1990s, with elections rigged and opposition sidelined.
Hun Manet, succeeding his father in 2023, promised reforms but has entrenched control amid an ongoing border war with Thailand, today largely paused under a fragile ceasefire. Sparked in July over territories like Preah Vihear, the border conflict displaced 270,000, killed hundreds, and escalated in December with airstrikes and heavy losses. Some125 Cambodian soldiers were reported dead.
This has fueled nationalism, but it also masked economic woes: Growth was slashed to 2 percent, investors fled, and illicit gambling and prostitution operations flourished behind fenced and guarded compounds on the border with Vietnam.
Repression is rife in Cambodia — media are Hun-influenced, dissent is labeled disloyal, and foreign mediation is rejected — echoing a “decline” under Hun Manet.
In Thailand political instability has fueled ongoing demonstrations in Bangkok. In August, the constitutional court dissolved the government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, sparking widespread protests demanding her resignation amid leaked scandals. By mid-December, a succeeding caretaker prime minister, Anutin Charnvirakul, faced a mere 8 percent approval rating, leading to the dissolution of the House of Representatives to avoid a no-confidence vote.
The Philippines meanwhile exemplifies democracy’s cyclical volatility. Rooted in the 1986 ousting of President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., its “partly free” status belies persistent rule by elite families and the “red-tagging” of critics.
Red tagging is labeling individuals, groups, or organizations as communists, subversives, or terrorists, often without evidence, typically by state actors like security forces or officials.
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., scandals over “ghost” flood-control projects — hundreds of billions of pesos siphoned off by politicians and contractors amid devastation by typhoons and torrential rains — ignited protests from September 2025, peaking with tens of thousands demanding resignation.
Meanwhile, a Marcos-Duterte rift, including impeachment bids against Vice President Sara Duterte, exposed fractures among the ruling elites, and midterm elections were tainted by AI disinformation.
Still, Philippine civil society’s vigor — clergy, youth, and activists — recalls past revolutions, with polls showing 80 percent favoring anti-corruption trials. Alliances with the United States and others presumably provide external ballast against an authoritarian drift.
These cases reveal broader themes in Southeast Asian democracy. First, economic inequality is a tinderbox: From Indonesia’s job crises to Cambodia’s war-induced stagnation and the Philippines’ graft-fueled disasters, unmet hopes for a better life breed unrest.
Second, militarization and nationalism as tools of control are evident in Prabowo’s reforms and Hun’s defiance.
Third, civil society is a counterweight — vibrant in Indonesia and the Philippines, although suppressed but simmering in Cambodia.
External powers exacerbate the situation: China’s influence in Cambodia contrasts with United States’ alliances in the Philippines, fueling a great-power contest over weak democracies.
Yet, democracy’s survival in Southeast Asia is not a foregone conclusion. Historical resilience — Indonesia’s decentralization, “people power” in the Philippines — suggests adaptability. If unrest catalyzes reforms, like transparent governance and demilitarization, these nations could fortify their systems. International scrutiny, from Amnesty International to the United Nations, adds pressure.
The next decade, with elections looming and climate crises intensifying, will test this. Without addressing root causes, hybrid regimes may proliferate, blending elections with repression.
Southeast Asia’s democracies teeter on a knife edge — threatened but tenacious. As protests echo from Jakarta to Phnom Penh and Manila, the region’s fate depends on whether citizens can reclaim agency from entrenched elites.
Democracy here isn’t a Western import but a homegrown struggle. It is one that, if nurtured, could inspire others beyond the archipelagoes.
Bryce McIntyre, PhD, resides in San Andres. He holds a doctoral degree from Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, USA. Grok AI was employed in research for this article.