Even though an overwhelming majority of Filipinos have long opposed involvement in any dispute between China and Taiwan, military action may be inevitable if China invades the island.
Nonetheless, the Philippines’ potential role in any such dispute recently has changed gears, shifting from the hypothetical to the plausible.
In August, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s stark declaration — that the Philippines would be “drawn kicking and screaming” into a war over Taiwan — sent shockwaves through the region. And this prompted a stern rebuke from Beijing, which accused the Philippines of “playing with fire.”
China views Taiwan as a “breakaway province”, a result of historical disputes between Chinese communists under Mao Tse Tung and Chinese nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. Beginning in late 1949, a million Chinese nationalists fled in a “Great Retreat”, as it was then called, from mainland China to Taiwan, where they set up their own government.
Today, in light of Taiwan’s prosperity and strategic location, China wants Taiwan back, promising the island status as a Special Administrative Region, like Hong Kong and Macau.
With nearly 250,000 Filipinos in Taiwan, and with nine U.S. military sites dotted across Philippine archipelago, the stakes for Filipinos couldn’t be higher.
At the heart of the Philippines’ vulnerability is its proximity to Taiwan. Northern Luzon is 250 kilometers from Taiwan’s southern tip, separated by the Luzon Strait — a heavily trafficked sea lane that could become a flashpoint in any invasion.
Analysts at the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank based in Sydney, have highlighted how this proximity places the Philippines squarely in China’s operational theater, where Beijing might seek to neutralize U.S.-aligned assets to secure sea lanes.
The Bashi Channel, a small part of the Luzon Strait about 80 kilometers wide, is a critical passageway for Chinese submarines and amphibious forces maneuvering south and east of Taiwan, making it a likely target for preemptive actions. Bashi Channel is located between Mavulis Island, which is part of the Philippines’ Batanes Islands, and Taiwan’s Orchid Island.
This isn’t idle speculation. In recent war games, including the annual U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercises in April, scenarios simulated Chinese incursions into Philippine territory as part of a broader Taiwan assault. “Balikatan” means “shoulder-to-shoulder” in English.
In addition to playing war games, and under a controversial Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, U.S. forces last year deployed Typhon missile systems in undisclosed locations in Luzon.
Philippines Military Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., head of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, echoed Marcos’ sentiments in August while inaugurating the new Mahatao Forward Operating Naval Base in Batanes and reiterating that involvement in any such conflict is “inevitable” due to geographic realities.
To put things in perspective, the People’s Liberation Army has 2 million active-duty personnel, compared with the AFP’s 160,000 — not to mention that China has the largest navy in the world with more than 1,000 fighting vessels, compared to the Philippines’ 115 fighting ships.
Some observers suggest China would strike Philippine outposts first — just to test U.S. resolve.
A 1951 mutual defense treaty with the United States forms the bedrock of Philippine security, obligating Washington to aid Manila in case of an armed attack.
In March, a statement on “defense industrial cooperation” promised U.S.-Philippine co-production of drones and cyber tools, bolstering Manila’s capabilities amid anticipated drone-dominated warfare.
Beyond the U.S., the Philippines is forging ties with Japan, Australia and Vietnam, focusing on joint patrols and intelligence-sharing. Quiet defense links with Taiwan, including coast guard cooperation, underscore intertwined fates.
No mutual defense pacts exist regionally, but U.S.-orchestrated “mini-laterals” like the Quad —Japan, the U.S., Australia and India — could amplify support.
A human element amplifies the risks: There are nearly 160,000 overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan, plus thousands of students, tourists and businessmen. Marcos has repeatedly cited this as a primary driver for involvement, stating that repatriation efforts would thrust the Philippines onto the front line.
Senate hearings in 2025 revealed contingency plans for non-combatant evacuations, but resources are stretched thin, with critics like Sen. Imee Marcos questioning the amount of money available.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, which has about 70 military bases and camps, are ramping up under the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, allocating a record ₱50 billion in 2025 for submarines, 3D-printed drones, and anti-ship missiles. Under this concept, the AFP is shifting the nation’s military posture from internal security to external defense.
Meanwhile, public sentiment in the Philippines leans toward neutrality, with 86 percent of Filipinos in 2024 polls favoring it, reflecting war weariness from historical parallels like the 1941 Japanese invasion.
Analysts warn of “entangled fronts,” where South China Sea incidents merge with strife in Taiwan, potentially sparking a wider conflict.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance adds uncertainty. In 2025, he evaded firm commitments to Taiwan, relying on personal rapport with Xi Jinping and economic threats like tariffs, while other American analysts advocate strategic ambiguity.
As geopolitical analyst Lyle Goldstein argued in April, U.S. pledges to arm Asian nations like the Philippines raise the ante, but Washington’s response might be cautious, as in the case with Ukraine.
As China flexes its muscles with military drills and warnings, the Philippines walks a tightrope — bolstering defenses while pursuing diplomacy. Marcos’ independent foreign policy aims to deter without provoking.
Bryce McIntyre, PhD, resides San Andres. He holds a doctoral degree from Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, USA. Grok AI was employed in research for this article.