NON EXCUSAT | Atty. Rene John M. Velasco:

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (PART 2)

Former Senator Leila M. de Lima, being the first nominee of Mamayang Liberal Partylist, is set to have her return in Congress after it attained sufficient number of votes to secure a seat in the House of Representatives. However, just days after the 2025 midyear elections, it was reported that the acquittal judgment of Congresswoman-elect De Lima rendered by RTC Muntinlupa was declared null and void by the Court of Appeals.

 

This news made the public question the application of the right against double jeopardy in the subject case. Though several legal luminaries had already discussed that the basis of such proclamation of nullity was the supposed deficiency in the body of the subject decision, the same shall not be the topic of this week’s edition as it is for the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to decide for that matter.

 

The focus of our discussion shall be the exception/s to the application of the right of double jeopardy. In one of the earlier column, we already tackled that in order to give life to the right against double jeopardy, the Court has, in numerous occasions, adhered to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, which provides that “a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.”[1]

The finality-of-acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution – the sovereign people, as represented by the State – was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine does not apply when the prosecution was denied its day in court – or basically being denied of due process.[2]

To state it differently, when there is grave abuse of discretion that has resulted in the violation of the State’s right to due process, thereby rendering the judgment of acquittal void, such as when: (a) the prosecution is denied the opportunity to present evidence; (b) the trial is a sham; (c) there is a mistrial. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process, and a denial of this guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. The capricious dismissal of an Information deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. Accordingly, it is a dismissal that is void and inexistent, and thus will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy.[3]

 

Pertinently, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as it is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[4]

 

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional right, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue, which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered nothwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a “lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head.[5]

 

To further elucidate this doctrine here are some cases cited in the case of Manuel T. Ubarra vs People of the Philippines[6] showing grave abuse of discretion depriving the State of its right to due process.

 

People vs Bocar, the Court set aside the acquittal of the accused after observing that the proceedings before the trial court are marred with irregularities – the prosecution was not given a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court, and the parties were not place under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge.

 

In Portugal v. Reantaso,[7] the respondent judge therein, during a hearing to resolve the defense’s motion to dismiss, denied said motion and on the same date called the case for hearing on the merits and presentation of the prosecution’s evidence. The prosecuting officer and witnesses were not notified before the case was tried on the merits on the said date, as the only incident for said hearing was the motion to dismiss. The private prosecutor requested for postponement on the ground that complainant and his witnesses were not notified of the hearing and thus not ready for trial, as well as the absence of representative from the fiscal’s office. However, the judge dismissed the case on motion of the counsel for the accused, solely on the ground of failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence during the day’s hearing.

In setting aside the dismissal of the case, the Court stressed that it was not possible for the prosecution to present its evidence on that date because of lack of notice, as well as the private prosecutor’s inability to conduct trial without authority from the prosecutor’s office. The need for proper notice of any material action in all cases is fundamental to due process; litigants should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their cases.

In People v. Pablo, the Court also set aside an order of acquittal, which was later amended to dismissal of the case, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The dismissal order was issued when the prosecution moved for postponement upon its inability to produce its last but vital witness, which would prove the causal relation between the wounds inflicted by the accused who assaulted the victim and the victim’s death. The Court observed that the respondent judge could have taken several other actions with fairness to both parties, as demanded by his function of dispensing justice and considering the gravity of the crime charged, but he utterly failed to do so.

The foregoing cases illustrate that when the State is unfairly prevented from establishing the merits of their case during trial, the Court may rectify such denial of due process by declaring the judgment of acquittal null and void.[8]

 

¹G.R. No. 237798 – Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs The People of the Philippines

²Idem

³Manuel T. Ubarra vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249890

⁴Idem

⁵Idem

⁶G.R. No. 249890

⁷Idem

⁸GR 249890 October 09, 2024

[1] G.R. No. 237798 – Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs The People of the Philippines

[2] Idem

[3] Manuel T. Ubarra vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249890

[4] Idem

[5] Idem

[6] G.R. No. 249890

[7] Idem

[8] GR 249890 October 09, 2024

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